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DUTIES OF THE ASYLUM STATE UNDER THE
UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT
P. WAMMFN GRm=*
As indicated by the title of this paper, discussion is limited to
a consideration of the duties of the asylum state under the uniform
criminal extradition act. The act, drafted and recommended by the
Interstate Commission on Crime and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, has been enacted in nineteen states.'
The unifoyn act was first approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1926; and in
1932 the Conference approved a revised draft of the act, changes
being made in Sections 5, 6, 13 and 14, which Act has been adopted
by twelve states. 2 A complete revised draft of the act was made by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and by the Interstate Commission on Crime in 1936 and important
changes were-made in Sections 5 and 6 and minor.changes in other
sections.
The present subject relative to the duties, of the asylum state,
or the state in which a wanted person is found, is divided into the
following four subjects and will be considered in the named order,
viz.:
A. Arrest upon requisition.
B. Arrest prior to requisition.
C. Arrest without a warrant..
D. Surrender of an accused person although not physically
present in demanding state at the time of crime.
A.

AMPXST UPoN REQu.srrioN,

Under the original law passed by Congress and approved by
President Washington, being the Act of Congress February 12, 1793,
* Attorney General, State of Delaware (1933-1939), Wilmington, Delaware.
Delivered before Thirty-second Annual Meeting of the National Association of
Attorneys-General, Cleveland, Ohio, 1939.
1Arizona, California, Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia.
2 Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Nebraska, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
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and now with a slight modification known as Section 5278 of the
United States Revised Statutes of 1875 (18 U. S. Code Ann. No.
662), it is made the duty of the executive authority of another
itate for a person as a fugitive from justice, upon receipt of proper
extradition papers "to cause him (fugitive) to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive
authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority
appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be
delivered to such agent when he shall appear," and Section. 2 of the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act likewise provides: 3
"FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE; DUTY OF GOVERNOR. Subject
to the provisions of this act, the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States controlling, and any and all acts of Congress enacted in
pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the Governor of this state to have
arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state
of the United States any person charged in that, state with treason,
felbny, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this
state."
Section 3 of the Uniform Act provides for the form of demand
which shall be submitted to the Governor of the asylum state which
must be accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by a
copy of a warrant supported by a proper affidavit, which according
to practice must fully set forth the facts and circumstances of the
alleged offense in order that the Governor of the asylum state may
determine therefrom whether he should grant or refuse the demand.
If the person wanted is an escaped convict then a copy of the judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof
must be submitted together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped
from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation
or parole. Such papers must be authenticated by the executive
authority of the demanding state. When such a demand is received
by the Governor of an asylum state from the executive authority
of another state for the surrendering of a person charged with a
crime, as provided by Section 4 of the Uniform Act, the Governor
may call upon the Attorney General or any prosecuting officei in the
State to investigate or assist in investigating the demand, and to
report to him the situation and circumstances of the person so demanded, and whether he ought to be surrendered. These provis At the Interstate Extradition Conference, held in New York in August, 1887,
the Governors of the States adopted Rules of Practice governing interstate requisition which are being followed today.

DUTIES OF THE ASYLUM STATE
sions immediately present some of the most important questions
relative to interstate rendition, all involved in the major question
of whether the duties of the Governor of an asylum state in extradition proceedings are discretionary or mandatory.
(a)

Substantially Charged With a Crime

Upon the receipt of a request for extradition two questions
are presented to the Governor of the asylum state:
(1) Is the
person for whom extradition is requested substantially charged with
a crime against the laws of the demanding state from whose justice
it is alleged that flight has been made? (2) Is he a fugitive from
justice from the demanding state?
"The first question is a question of law and the latter is a question of fact."'4
The law requires that the demand or request for requisition
shall be in writing and must allege that the accused was present
(except in ,cases arising under Section 6) in the demanding state
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled from the State, whicli must be accompanied by a copy
of an indictment found, or 'by information supported by affidavit,
or by a copy of an affidavit made before a Magistrate there, together
with a copy of any warrant issued thereupon, or by a copy of a
judgment of conviction or of sentence imposed in execution thereof
together with a statement by the Governor of the demanding state
that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken
the terms of his bail, probation or parole. While the Uniform law
does not require copies of such papers to be certified, the rules of
practice heretofore existing, hiving been adopted by the Interstate
Extradition Conference in 1887, require a certification thereof and
the uniform law requires that such papers "must be authenticated
by the executive authority making the demand." The authentication need not be in any particular form as long as it clearly appears
that the documents are what they purport to be, as the Federal
Statute for the authentication of public acts and judicial proceedings
does not regulate the manner in, which the authentication by the
Governor shall be made.5 The manner of authentication is left to
each State and the question of authenticity is one for the determination of the Governor of the demanding State and his certificate
4 Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364; Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691; Roberts v.
Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95.
5 State v. Curry, 2 Ala. A. 251, 56 S. 736.
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to this fact is all that is required. If these provisions are not complied with, it is universally held that the person demanded is not
substantially "charged" with a crime and the Governor of the

asylum state has no duty to grant the demand. 7 Some decisions
hold that inasmuch as the person wanted is not substantially charged
with a crime that the Governor of the asylum state has no authority under such defective demand to grant extradition. This conclusion is expressed by the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of
Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1 at page 6:
"Undoubtedly, the statuts does not make it the duty of a Governor
to issue a warrant for the arrest of an alleged fugitive from justice,

unless the executive of the demanding State produces to him either a
copy of an indictment against the accused in the demanding State or an
affidavit before a magistrate of such State charging the fugitive with the
commission of crime in the State making the demand. It is, we think,
equally clear that thel executive of the State in which the fugitive is at
the time may decline to honor the requisition of the Governor of the
demanding State if the latter fails to furnish a copy of an indictment
against the accused, or of any affidavit before a magistrate. But has
the executive of the State, upon whom the demand is made for the arrest
and extradition o4 the fugitive, the power to issue his warrant of arrest
for a crime committed in another State, unless he is furnished with a
copy of the required indictment or affidavit? We are of opinion that he
has not, so far as any authority in respect to fugitives from justice has
been conferred upon him by the statute of the United States. The statute, we think, makes it essential to the right to arrest the alleged fugutive
under a warrant of the executive of the State where the alleged fugitive
is found that such executive be furnished, before issuing his warrant,
with a copy of an indictment or an affidavit before a magistrate in the
demanding State, and charging the fugitive with crime committed by
him in such State."
A9 stated the question of whether a person demanded is substantially charged with a crime under the Federal Constitution, the
Federal law and the Uniform Extradition Act, is a question of law,
and if the Governor of the demanding State has any doubts thereon
he should refer this question to his legal adviser, the Attorney
General, which, while he has the general authority so to do, is
specifically provided for by Section 4 of the Uniform Act.
6 Ex parte Baker, 244 P. 459; Munsedy v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364; Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1; I1 re Gundy, 236 P. 440.

7McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100 at 108; Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U. S. 63;
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80 at 95; Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691; Pierce v.
Creecy, 210 U. S. 387.
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Fugitive From Justice

If it is determined that the submitted papers are in proper
form it then becomes the duty of the Governor to determine whether
the person demanded is a fugitive from justice from the demanding
State. This is a question of fact and must be determined.by the
Governor of the asylum State. If he is satisfied of this fact by the
authenticated papers before him, it becomes his duty to grant the
demand and issue his warrant of arrest and surrender, and he need
not look beyond the authenticated papers.8
However, in many cases the Governors of asylum States are
often requested to grant a-hearing before honoring extradition. It
is solely within the province of the Governor whether to grant
such a hearing and 9his refusal to do so is for his own determination
and not reviewable.
As a practical matter the 'Governors of our States seldom, if
ever, refuse to grant a hearing when timely applied for, especially
if the person demanded claims that he is not a fugitive from justice.
If a hearing is granted and thereat it is conceded that the alleged fugitive was not- in the demanding state at the time of the
alleged crime,10 or if he establishes such fact to" the entire satisfaction of the Governor, then it becomes his duty to refuse to grant
the request and to surrender the alleged fugitive. On the other
hand, if there is a conflict of evidence on whether the person sought
was in the demanding state at the time of the charged crime, and
the Governor is not convinced "by clear and satisfactory evidence
that he was outside the limits of" the demanding state at the time
of the crime, it becomes the duty of the Governor to grant requisitioh.1 ,
The general principles here stated are well summed up in
McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100 at 108: the opinion stating the
following conclusions are to be deduced from former decisions of
that Court: '12
"1. A person charged with crime against the laws of a State and
who flees from justice, that is, after committing the crime, leaves the
State, in whatever way or for whatever reason, and is found in another
8 Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 at 204; Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U. S. 63;
McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100 at 108.

9 Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364. For list of cases see 51 A. L. . p. 810.
25 C. T., §33, p. 267.
10 Mu.sey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364; South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412.

" Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364; South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412;
McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100 at 108; Hyatt v. CorlcranA 188 U. S. 691.
12 See also Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364 at 372.

P. WARREN GREEN
State, may, under the authority of the Constitution and laws of the
United States, be brought back to the State in which he stands charged
with the crime, to be there dealt with according to law.
2. When the Executive authority of the State whose laws have been
thus violated makes such a demand upon the Executive of the State in
which the alleged fugitive is found as is indicated by the above section
(5278) of the Revised Statutes-producing at the time of such demand a
copy of the indictment, or an affidavit certified as authentic and made
before a magistrate charging the person demanded with a crime against
the laws of the demanding State-it becomes, under the Constitution and
laws of the United States, the duty of the Executive of the State where
tle fugitive is found to cause him to be arrested, surrendered and
delivered to the appointed agent of the demanding State, to be taken
to that State.
3. Nevertheless, the Executive, upon whom such demand is made,
not being authorized by the Constitution and laws of the United States
to cause the arrest of one charged with crime in another State unless he
is a fugitive from justice, may decline to issue an -extradition warrant,
unless it is made to appear to him, by competent proof, that the accused
is substantially charged with crime against the laws of the demanding
State, and is, in fact, a fugitive from the justice of that State.
4' Whether the alleged criminal is or is not such fugitive from
justice may, so far as the Constitution and laws of the United States
are concerned, be determined by the Executive upon whom the demand
is made in such way as he deems satisfactory, and he is not obliged to
demand proof apart from proper requisition papers from the demanding
State, that the accused is a fugitive from justice.
5. If it be determined that the alleged criminal is a fugitive from
justice-whether such determination be based upon the requisition and
accompanying papers in proper form, or after an original, independent
inquiry into the facts-and if a warrant of arrest is issued after such
detemination, the warrant will be regarded as making a prima facie .case
in favor of the demanding State and as requiring the removal of the
alleged criminal to the State in which he stands charged with crime,
unless in some appropriate proceeding it is made to appear that he is
not a fugitive from the justice of the demanding State.
6. A proceeding by habeas corpus in a court of competent jurisdiction is appropriate for determining whether the accused is subject, in
virtue of the warrant of arrest, to be taken as a fugitive from the justice
of the State in which he is found to the State whose laws he is charged
with violating.
7. One arrested and held as a fugitive from justice is entitled, of
right, upon habeas corpus, to question the lawfulness of his arrest and
imprisonment, showing by competent evidence, as a ground for his release, that he was not, within thq meaning of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, a fugitive from the justice of the demanding State,
and thereby overcoming the presumption to the contrary arising from
the fact of an extradition warrant."
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In the concluding paragraph of the opinion the Court states:
"* * * te should not be discharged from custody unless it is made

clearly and satisfactorilyto appear that he is not a fugitive from justice
within the meaning of the Constitution and laws of the United States.
We may repeat the thought expressed in Appleyard's case, above cited,
that a faithful, vigorous enforcement of the constitutional and statutory
provisions relating to fugitives from justice is vital to the harmony and
welfare of the States, and that 'while a State should take care, within
the limits of the law, that the rights of .its people are protected against
illegal action, the judicial authorities of the Union shall equally take
care that the provisions of the' Constitution be not so narrowly interpreted as to enable offenders against the laws of a State to find a
permanent asylum in the territory of another State."'
(c)

Completed Crime or Length of Presence Immaterial

There are a series of cases holding that a fugitive from justice
includes one who while present does an overt act intended to be a
material step towards the accomplishment of a crime and further
that it is immaterial the lehgth of time such a person is present in
the demanding State. The leading case thereon is Strassheim v.
Daily, 221 U. S. 280. In part the Court held that if the accused led
to a betrayal of a trust and induced a fraud, "the usage of the
civilized world would warrant Michigan in punishing him, although
he never had set foot in the State until after the fraud was complete. Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect,
if the State should succeed in getting him within its power. (Cases
citid.) We may assume therefore that Daily is a criminal under
the laws of Michigan."
"Of course we must admit that it does not follow that Daily is a
fugitive from justice. Hyatt v. Corkran,188 U. S.691, 712. On the other
hand, however, we think it plain that the criminal need not do within
the State every act necessary to complete the crime. If he does there
an overt act which is and is intended, to be a material step toward accomplishing the crime, and then abserits himself from the State and does
the rest elsewhere, he becomes a fugitive from justice, when the crime
is complete, if not before. In re Cogk, 49 .Fed. Rep. 833, 843, 844. Ex
parte Hoffstot, 180 Fed. Rep. 240, 243. In re William Sultan, 115 No. Car.
57. For all that is necessary to convert a criminal under the laws of a
State into a fugitive from justice is that he should have left the State
a fugitive from justice is that he should have left the State after having
incurred guilt there, Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S.80, and his overt act
becomes retrospectively guilty when the contemplated result ensues.
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Thus in this case offering the bid and receiving the acceptance were
material steps in the scheme, they were taken in Michigan, and they
were established in their character of guilty acts when the plot was
carried to the end, even if the intent with which those steps were taken
did not make Daily guilty before. Swift v. United States, 196 U. S.
375, 396."
To the same effect is Getzendanner v. Hiltner, 185 S. E. 694,
decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in 1936.
The evidence showed that if the relator was guilty of false pretences as charged in the indictment, it was while he was in Maryland where he set in motion the fraudulent scheme which culminated in later obtaining the money at a time when he was not
present:
"A fugitive from justice, in contemplation of the Federal Constitution, need not have been in the demanding state at the time of the
completion of the crime, if, while in the state, he has committed some
overt act in furtherance of the offense, subsequently consummated 'to be a
"fugitive from justice," it is necessary that the person charged as such
must have been, actually present in the demanding state at the time of
the commission of the crime, or having been there, has then committed
some overt act in furtherance of the crime subsequently consummated,
and has departed to another jurisdiction.'" (Cases cited.)
To the same effect are the following cases: People v. Enright,
217 N. Y. S. 288; Ex parte Hoffstat, 180 F. 240, Aff'd 218 U. S. 665;
Ex parte Finch, 182 N. W. 565, 106 Neb. 45; Zulch v. Roach, 151
P. 1101, 23 Wyo. 335; Ex parte Forbes, 85 So. 590, 17 Ala. App. 405;
Cert. denied 85 So. 921, 124 Ala. 698; Ex parte Graham, 216 F. 813;
State v. Gerber, 126 N. W. 482, 111 Minn. 132; In re Malicord, 191
S. E. 730, 211 N. C. 684; People v. Gargan, 168 N. Y. S. 1027,. 181
App. Div. 410; 11 R. C. L., §24, pp. 731-2; 25 C. J., §12, p. 258.
In Ex parte Montgomery, 244 Fed. 967, affirmed 246 U. S. 656
the alleged fugitive admitted his presence in the demanding State
and it was shown that there was opportunity for an actual conference with a co-conspirator during the period of the conspiracy as
charged in the indictment.
Included in these cases are those in which an alleged fugitive
voluntarily surrendered himself in the demanding State and after
giving bond or being tried and convicted departed therefrom, and
such are held to be fugitives and within the extradition law, although as a matter of fact such persons were not present in the
demanding State at the time the crime was committed. State v.
Brown, 64 S. W. (2d) 841, 166 Tenn. 669, 91 A. L. R. 1246. Cert.
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denied 292 U. S. 638; Ex parte Morris, 101 S. W. (2d) 259; Keeton
v. Gaiser, 55 S. W. (2d) 302, 331 Mo. 499; Grogan v. Welch, 227 N.
W. 74, 55 S. D. 613, 67 A. L. R. 1474; Ex parte Taylor, 101 S. W. (2d)
579.
To this principle there should be added those cases holding
where an alleged fugitive is charged with desertion or non-support,
a continuous crime, and it appears that the alleged fugitive was in
the demanding State, even though for a few hours during the time
when he is charged that the crime was committed, that such a person
is a fugitive from justice, although he went into the demanding
State for a lawful purpo'se and not in furtherance of the crime
and left before an indictment was found. People v. Brown, 237 N.
Y. 485, 143 N. E. 653, 23 A. L. R. 1164. Reversing 201 N. Y. S.
862; (See annotations in 32 A. L. R. 1164); Ex parte Heath, 287 P.
636, 87 Mont. 370; Chase v. State; 113 So. 103.

Arrest of Fugitive
As provided by Section 7 of the Uniform Act:
ItUthe Governor decides that the demand should be complied with
he shall sign a warrant of arrest, which shall be sealed with the State
seal, and be directed to any peace officer or other person whom he
may think fit taq entrust with the executior2 thereof. The warrant must
substantially recite the facts- necessary to the validity of its issuance.'
This warrant of arrest can be issued only by the Governor
(but a statute of the State may authorize the Lieutenant Governor
to issue it in his absence) as the statute provides the warrant "must
substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance"; which means (a) that the fugitive has been demanded by, the
Governor of the State from which he made flight as a fugitive
from justice; (b) that he is charged with a specified crime; (c) that
such a demand is supported by the proper papers required by the
certified as authentic
Uniform Act; (d) and that such have been
3
by the Governor of the demanding State.
The Governor's warrant, by Section 8, authorizes a "peace officer or other person to whom directed to arrest the accused at any
time and any place . . . and to deliver the accused. . . to the duly
authorized agent of the demanding State."
13 Compton v. Alabama, 214 U. S. 1; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 95; Hyatt v.
Corkran, 188 U. S. 691; Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387; Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U. S.
63; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 227; Biddinger v. Commissioner of
Police of New York, 245 U. S. 128; McNichols v. Pease, 207 U. S. 100 at 108.
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As a practical matter the Governor's warrants issued by the
several States show that such are addressed "To any Sheriff, Coroner or any other Peace Officer in the State" and authorizes, as
provided by the Act, any such officer "to command the aid of all
peace officers or other persons in the execution of the warrant."
(a)

Right to Apply for Writ of Habeas Corpus

While the Governor's warrant directs the authorized peace
officer to arrest the accused "and to deliver the accused '. ..

to

the duly authorized agent of the state" such can be done only as
provided by Section 8 "subject to the provisions of this Act." These
provisions are set forth in Section 10 granting to the person arrested the right, and requires, that he shall before delivery to the
authorized agent "first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court
of record in this state, who shall inform him of the demand made
for his surrender and of the crime with which he is charged, and
that he has the right to demand and procure legal counsel; and
if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they desire to
test the legality of his arrest, the judge of such court of record shall
fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for
a writ of habeas corpus." Before the adoption of this provision
giving to the alleged fugitive the right to apply for a habeas corpus
there was a wide conflict in the decisions on whether there could
be a judicial review of the issuance of the Governor's warrant by
a writ of habeas corpus. This is stated in Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of the City of New York, 245 U. S. 128 as follows:
"The scope and limits of the hearing on habeas corpus in such cases
has not been, perhaps it should not be, determined with precision.
Doubt as to the jurisdiction of the courts to review at -all the
executive conclusion that the person accused is a fugitive from
justice has more than once been stated in the decisions of this court, Ex
parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80; Appleyard v.
Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222; but the question not being necessary for
the disposition of the cases in which it is touched upon, as it is not in
this, it is left undecided This much, however, the decisions of this court
make clear; that the proceeding is a summary. one, to be kepf within
narrow bounds, not less for the protection of the liberty of the citizen
than in the public interest; that when the extradition papers required
by the statute are in the proper form the only evidence sanctioned by
this court as admissible on such a hearing is such as tends to prove
that the accused was not in the demanding State at the time the crime
is alleged to have been committed; and, frequently and emphatically, that
defenses cannot be entertained on such a hearing, but must be referred
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for investigation to the trial of the case in the courts of the demanding
State."
Is Duty to Surrender Obligatory?
Recently there has been much discussion on whether a Governor of an asylum state must honor requisition and surrender
a fugitive from justice when the demand is in proper form and it is
clearly established that the person wanted is a fugitive from justice.
The Federal Constitution provides that such a fugitive ".
shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which
he fled be delivere
.4 up . . .," and the Federal law provides "It
shall be the duty of the executive authority....
to cause him
(fugitive) to be arrested and secured . . . and to cause the fugitive
to be delivered" to the named agent.
By Section 2 of the Uniform Act it is likewise provided:
"It is the duty. of the Governor of this State to have arrested and
delivered up to th4, executive authority of any other State of the United
States any perso Zliarged in that State with treason, felony or other
crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this State'
The first expression on this subject by the U. S. Supreme Court
was in the case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 16 L. Ed. 717.
In speaking of the Constitutional provision 4 Chief Justice Taney
said:
'This compact engrafted in the Constitution included, and was intended to include, every offense made punishable by the law of the
state in which it was committed, and that it gives the right to the executive authority of the State to demand the fugitive from the executive
authority of the State in which he is found; that the right given to
demanl implies that it is an absolute right; and it follows that there
must be a correlative obligation to deliver, without any reference to the
character of the crime charged, or to the policy or laws of the State-to
which the fugitive has fled."
"This duty, of providing by law the regulations necessary to carry
this compac into execution, from the nature of the duty and the object
in view, was manifestly devolved upon Congress; for if it was left to
the States, each State might require different proof to authenticate the
judicial proceedings upon which the demand was founded; and as the
duty of the Governor of the State where the fugitive was found is, in
such cases, merely ministerial, without the right to exercise either executive or judicial discretion, he could not lawfully issue a warrant to
arrest an individual without a law of the State * * *'"
14 U. S. Constitution Art. IV, Sec. 2.
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Further:
"* * * The duty which he is to perform is, as we have already said,
merely ministerial-that is, to cause the party to be arrested, and
delivered to the agent or authority of the State where the crime was
committed. It is said in the argument, that the executive officer upon
whom this demand is made must have a discretionary executive power,
because he must inquire and decide who is the person demanded. But
this certainly is not- a discretionary duty upon which he is to exercise
any judgment, but is a mere ministerial duty-that is, to do the act
required to be done by him, and such as every marshal and sheriff must
perform wheq process, either criminal or civil, is placed in his hands to
be served on the person named in it. And it never has been supposed
that this duty involved any discretionary power, or made him anything
more than a mere ministerial officer; and such is the position and character of the Executive of the State undeV this law, when the demand is
made upon him and the requisite evidence produced. The Governor
has only to issue his warrant to an agent or officer to arrest the party
named in the demand."

In 1873 in the case of Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wallace 366, 21 L.
Ed. 287, the Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut- in part said:
"It is true that the ccnstitutional provision and the law of Congress,
under which the arrest and delivery were made, are obligatory upon
every State and a part of the law of every State. But the duty enjoined
is several and not joint; and every governor acts separately and independently for himself. There can be no joint demand and no joint
neglect or refusal. In the event of a refusal, the State making the
demand must submit. There is no alternative."
An indirect reference is made to this matter in Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624 at p. 638. This case holds that an agent appointed by the demanding State to receive a fugitive is a State and
not an officer of the United States. In answer to the propounded
question by the court whether "could it be claimed that the arrest
of the fugitive would be in pursuance of the Acts of Congress, or
that the agent of the demanding State had authority from the
United States to receive and hold him to be transported to that
State?" The Court answers:
'This question could not be answered in the affirmative, except upon
the supposition, not to be indulged., that, so far as the Constitution and
the legislation of Congress are concerned, the transporting of a personbeyond the limitt of the State in which he resides, or happens to be,
to another State, depends entirely, upon the arbitrarywill of the executive authorities of the State demanding and of the State surrendering
him.o
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Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691, 712, states that Section 5278
of the Revised Statutes upon the presentation of a demand accompanied by proper papers duly authenticated "makes it the duty
of the executive authority of the State to which such person
has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured" and later quotes,
and thereby apparently approves, the statement of the Court in
Kentucky v. Dennison, supra, that such a duty is ministerial, and
noi discretionary, a "moral obligation" binding upon the Governor
of an -asylum State, but with no power in the courts to compel the
fulfillment of this duty.
Similarly is the Court's opinion in Marbles v. Creecy, 215 U.
S.63 at 67:
"And when the Governor of Missouri was furnished, as he was, with
a copy of the indictment against Marbles, certified by the Governor of
Mississippi to be authentic, it then becamo the duty of the Governor of
Missouri, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to cause
the arrest of the alleged fugitive. So reads the statute enacted in execution of the constitutional provision relating to fugitives from justice.
Rev. Stat. No. 5278."
Justice Holmes in passing upon the right of the State of New
York to secure the return of Thaw from the State of New Hampshire after his escape from the Matteawan State Hospital states in
reversing an order discharging Thaw:
"In extradition proceedings, even when as here a humane opportunity is afforded to test them upon habeas corpus, the purpose of the
writ is not to substitute the judgment of another tribunal upon the facts
or the law of the matter to be tried. The Constitution says nothing about
habeas corpus in this connection, but peremptorily requires that upon
proper demand the person charged shall be delivered up to be removed
to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."' 5
South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412, 53 S. Ct. 667 is noted
for its analogous ruling, as therein it is stated in reference to the
duty of the State Court to pass upon the "irreconcilable conflict
of evidence" as to the presence of the alleged fugitive in the demanding State:
"It was the duty of that Court to administer the law prescribed by
the Constitution and statute of the United States, as construed by this
Court." (Cases cited.)
Whether the duty of the Governor of an asylum State to surrender a properly charged fugitive from justice is obligatory or
discretionary is summed up in 25 C. J., p. 265, as follows:
15 Drew v. State, 235 U. S. 432 at 439.
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"This duty is ministerial and not discretionary and has been described as imperative, although in the absence of statute there is no
power to compel the executive to act."
See also annotation to Ex parte Germain, 51 A. L. R. 789.
Also People v. Murray, 192 N. E. 198, 357 Ill. 326, 94 A. L. R. 1487.
B.

ARREST PRIOR TO REQUISITION

Due to the present rapid means of communication between the
police systems of the various States by air mail, telegraph, radio
and teletype, when a State desires a person as a fugitive from justice, it is a common practice to request arrest and detention prior
to the preparation of extradition papers, and in most cases the
person wanted is in the custody of the police officials or on bail in
the asylum state at the time the demand for extradition is presented
to the Governor.
Section 13 of the Uniform Act sanctions an arrest prior to
requisition. This provision authorizes the arrest of a fugitive whenever he "shall be charged on the oath of any credible person before
any judge or magistrate of this state with the commission of any
crime in any other state," and is believed to be in the asylum state,
whereupon "the judge or magistrate shall issue a warrant directed
to any peace officer commanding him to apprehend the person
named therein, wherever he may be found in this state, and to bring
him before the same or any other judge, magistrate or court who
or which may be available in or convenient of access to the place
where the arrest may be made, to answer the charge or complaint
and affidavit."
That this provision is fully authorized *and such an arrest is
legal is passed upon in Burton v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 245 U. S.
315 at 318.
"These provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes do not
deal with arrest in advance of a requisition. They do not limit the
power of a State to arrest, within its borders, a citizen of another State
for a crime committed elsewhere; nor do they prescribe the manner in
which such arrest may be made. These are matters left wholly to the
individual states. Whether the asylum state shall make an arrest in
advance of requisition, and if so, whether it may be made without a
warrant, are matters which each state decides for itself. Such has been
the uniform practice, sanctioned by a long line of decisions and regulated
by legislation in many of the States."
Thereto is attached the following footnote:
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"The decisions appear to be uniform that at common law arrest in
advance of requisition is legal." (Cited cases.) See also 11 R. C. L.
p. 720, §10.
C.

ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT

Heretofore many questions have arisen as to the right of a
peace officer or of a private .citizen to cause an arrest without a
warrant of an alleged fugitive.
Section 14 of the Uniform Act specifically authorizes and makes
legal the arrest of a person by any peace officer or a private person
"without a warrant upon reasonable information that the accused
stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by
death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." If such an
arrest is made, the act requires the arrested person to be immediately taken before a Judge or Magistrate and a complaint must
be made against him under oath setting forth the ground for his
arrest; thereafter the proceedings shall be same as if he had been
arrested on a warrant.
While this provision was intended to overcome many of the
problems heretofore existing it is found by actual experience that
many questions still exist.
As stated, most of the present arrests of fugitives from justice
are made upon a receipt of a wanted message by telegraph, radio
or teletype, and such, while indicating the nature of the alleged
crime, often do not indicate whether the alleged crime is a misdemeanor or felony, or is punishable "by death or imprisonment for
a term exceeding one year." In the case of a telegraphic message
there is a possibility that such might have been sent other than by
a police authority, but not when the message is sent by radio or
teletype, as certain code methods are used to establish authenticity
and the teletype system used by the police is a distinctive service
solely established for police work. While at the common law any
person, whether a peace officer or a private citizen, had the right
to arrest a person known to have committed a felony, or one whom
he had reasonable or probable grounds to suspect of having committed a felony,' 6 but could only arrest a person charged with a
misdemeanor when such criminal act was committed in the presence
of the peace officer or private person."7 Further, while at the common: law there was a well established distinction between felonies
16 6 C. J. S. p. 586 and 606: Kurtz v. Moffitt. 111 U. S. 487, 504; Burton v. N. Y.
Cent. & H. River R. R. Co., 245 U. S. 315; Stallings v. Splain, 253 U. S. 339 at 341.

S76 C. J. S. 589 and 607.
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and misdenieanors the line of demarkation does not now exist
in most of the States and in those states where the common law
principle does not exist a felony is a crime where the possible imprisonment exceeds a term of one year.18

It is for this reason that Section 14 authorizes an arrest without
a warrant by a peace officer or private citizen for a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
In view of these provisions it is suggested that if a local officer,
upon the receipt of a message that a person is wanted as a, fugitive
from justice for a crime, is doubtful whether the crime is a felony
or a misdemeanor, or the possible punishment therefor is imprisonment exceeding one year, if he believes the message has come from
a recognized peace authority, the better course to be pursued would
be for the officer to go before a magistrate and make oath, that he
is advised by the police authorities of the demanding state that the
named person is charged with a specific crime and is a fugitive
from justice, whereupon it would become the duty of the magistrate
to issue his warrant for the alleged fugitive under the provisions of
Section 13 of the Uniform Act, often called a fugitive warrant.
Such a course of action would fully protect the arrested person and
the peace officer making the arrest, as unquestionably he had authority to make the complaint against the alleged fugitive.
In the case of People v. Ormsby, '241 N. Y. S. 225, 136 Misc. 637
it was held that peace officers are justified in making an arrest
without a warrant of a non-resident within the State, upon telegraphic information received from a police department of a city of
another State that the person designated is suspected of a felony;
and in Cunningham v. Balcer, 16 So. 68, 104 Ala. 160, 53 Am. S. R.
27 it was held that to support such an arrest without a warrant
there must be a reasonable cause to believe the crime committed
was a felony. These cases are sufficient authority to say that upon
the receipt of a message that a named person is wanted, a local
peace officer, if he believes the message is an authentic one and from

a recognized police source, is empowered to cause the arrest of the
named person without a warrant, if the crime charged is a-felony
or the possible punishment exceeds a year, or to swear out'a fugitive warrant before a magistrate based upon the message, preserving the message as authority for his action.
In this connection notation is made of the case of Malcolms v.

Scott, 23 N. W. 166, 56 Mich. 459 holding that an officer is not auis

This is the Federal rule-See U. S. C. A.
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thorized to make an arrest without a warrant based upon a letter
signed by an unknown person when it does not appear that a
prosecution for the alleged offense has been commenced in aiiother
State and the letter does not'set forth the facts constituting the
offense.
D.

SURRmiM

Accusm Pmasox ALTHOUGH NOT PHYSICALLY
In DEMANDING STAT.E AT TEME OF CRmE

OF Aw

PRESENT

The present Uniform Criminal Extradition Act by Section 6,
embodies an entirely new provision and confers upon the Governor
of an asylum state the discretionary power to cause the arrest and
surrender by extradition of persons not present in the demanding
State at the time of the commission of a crime, who commit an act
intentionally resulting in a crime in the demanding State, even
though the accused was not in that State at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom.
Section 6 in full provides:
"EXTRADITION, OF PERSONS NOT PRESENT IN DEMANDING
STATE AT TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME. The Governor of
this state may also "surrender, on demand of the Executive Authority
of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state
in the manner provided in Section 3 with committing an act in this state,
or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose
Executive Authority is making the demand, and the provisions of this
act not otherwise inconsistent, shall apply to such cases, even though
the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the
crime, and has not fled therefrom."
This provision was included to definitely confer upon the Governor of a State, statutory authority to permit the extradition of
such criminals, as it is now well recognized that the leaders or
brains of crirminal gangs while sending their henchmen into a State
to do an unlawful act, purposely refrain from going themselves,
and if linked to a crime and arrested claim they are not fugitives
from justice and not subject to extradition proceedings. This provision is also intended to reach persons engaged in unlawful conspiracies, obtaining property by false pretenses, "get-rich-quick"
schemes, perpetrated by telephone, telegraph, mail or through an
innocent local agent.
The decisions, heretofore, have been practically of one accord
in holding that only a person who was in the demanding State at
the time of the commission of a crime and thereafter made flight
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therefrom could be arrested and surrendered in interstate rendition. 19
Often it was urged before the Court that if it could be shown
that the alleged defendant committed or participated in the crime
in the demanding State, that extradition should be granted based on
a constructive presence. The U. S. Supreme Court has uniformly
held that actual presence is necessary and requisition cannot be
granted based upon the doctrine of a constructive presence of the
accused in the demanding State. The leading case thereon in the
U. S. Supreme Court is Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U.-S. 691 to the following effect:
*"Itis, however, contended that a person may be guilty of a larceny
or false pretense within a State without being personally present in the
State at the time, therefore the indictments found were sufficient justification for the requisition and for the action of the governor of New
York thereon. This raises the question whether the relator could have
been a fugitive from justice when it is conceded he was not in the State
of Tennessee at the time of the commission of those acts for which he
had been indicted, assuming that he committed them outside of the
State.
The exercise of jurisdiction by a State to make an act committed
outside its borders a crime against the State is one thing, but to assert
that the party committing such act comes under the Federal statute,
and is to be delivered up as a fugitive from the justice of that State, is
quite a different proposition.
The language of section 5278, Rev. Stat., provides, as we think, that
the act shall have been committed by an individual who was at the
time of its commission personally present within the State which demands his surrender. It speaks of a demand by thl executive authority
of a State for the surrender of a person as a fugitive from justice, by the
executive authority of a State to which such person has fled, and it
provides that a copy of the indictment found, or affidavit made before
a magistrate of any State, charging the person demanded with having
committed treason, etc., certified as authentic by the governor or chief
magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged
has fled, shall be produced, and it makes it the duty of the executive
authority of the State to which such person has fled to cause him to be
arrested and secured. Thus the person who is sought must be one who
has fled from the demanding State, and he must have fled (not necessarily
directly) to the State where he is found. It is difficult to see how a
person can be said to have fled from the State in which he is charged
to have committed some act amounting to a crime against that State,
when in fact he was not within the State at the time the act is said to
have been committed. How can a person flee from a place that he was
-a 25 C. J., §12, p. 257; 11 R. C. L., §24, p. 731. Scott on Interstate Rendition, Chapter VII, pp.64-8&. For list of cases see 51 A. L. R. 798 and 55 A. L. R.349.
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not in? He could avoid a place that he had not been in; he could omit
to go to it; but how can it be said with accuracy that he has fled from
a place in which he had not been present? This is neither a narrow
nor, as we think, an incorrect interpretation of the statute. It has been
in existence since 1793, and we have found no case decided by this court
wherein it has been held that the statute covered a case
where the party was not in the State at the time when the act is alleged
to have been committed. We think the plain meaning of the act requires such presence, and that it was not intended to include, as a
fugitive from the justice of a State, one- who had not been. in the State
at the time when, if ever, the offense was committed, and who had not,
therefore in fact, fled therefrom."
The Court then reviews Ex pcrte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 651,
to the following effect:
Undoubtedly, the act of Congress did not impose upon the
**
executive authority of the Territory- the duty of surrendering the appellant, unless it was made to appear, in some proper way, that he was a
fugitive from justice. In other .words, the appellant was entitled, under
the act of Congress, to insist upon proof that he was within the demanding State at the time he is alleged to have committed the crime charged,
and subsequently withdrew from her jurisdiction, so that -he could not
be reached by her criminal process. The statute, it is to be observed,
does not prescribe the character of such proof;. but that the executive
authority of the Territory was not required, by the act of Congress, to
cause the arrest of appellant, and his delivery to the agent appointed
by the governor of Pennsylvania, without proof of the fact that he
was a fugitive from justice, is, in. our judgment, clear from the language
of that act. Any other interpretation would lead to the conclusion that
the mere requisition by the executive of the demanding State, accompanied by the copy of an indictment, or an affidavit before a magistrate,
certified by him to be authentic, charging the accused with crime committed within her limits, imposes upon the executive of the State or
Territory where the accused is found, the duty of surrendering him,
although he may be satisfied, from incontestible proof,. that the accused
had, in fact, never been in the demanding State, and, therefore, could
not be said to have fled from its justice, -Upon the executive of the
State in which the accused is found rests the responsibility of determining, in some legal mode,, whether he is a fugitive from the justice of the
demanding State. He does not fail in duty if he makes it a condition
precedent to the surrender of the accused that it be shown to him, by
competent proof, that the accused is, in fact, a fugitive from the justice
of the demanding State."
From this case and also from Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80
the Court concludes:
"It is clear that it was regarded by the court as essential that the
person should have been in the State which demanded his surrender
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at the time of the commission of the offense alleged in the affidavit or
indictment, and that it was a fact jurisdictional in its nature, without
which he could not be proceeded against under the Federal statute."
The Court further holds:
"Many state courts before whom the question -has come have held
that a merely constructive presence in the demanding State at the time.'
of the alleged commission of the offense was not sufficient to render the
person a fugitive from justice; that he must have been personally present
within the State at the time of the alleged commission of the act, or else
he could not be regarded as a fugitive from justice. Spear and also
Moore on Extraditiorg are to the same effect. Those authorities and text
writers are referred to in the margin"
(Cases cited.)
For other U. S. Supreme Court decisions see Prigg v. Conmonwealth, 16 Pet. 539; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642 at 651;
Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U. S. 364;
Pierce v. Creecy, 210 U. S. 387.
In the report of the Commission jointly appointed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State laws and the
Interstate Commission on Crime, which drafted the present uniform law, in recommending the draft thereof the report shows that
fifteen rules are laid down as embracing the best features in various
State statutes and codifies the better views contained in judicial
decisions and the rule relative to Section 6 is stated as follows:
"That an asylum state, in the discretr of the governor, has power
to surrender on demand of another state, a person not required under
the Constitution to be extradited because he was not in the demanding
state at the time when the alleged crime was committed, and has
not fled therefrom, if the law of the asylum state would provide for
punishment of the person claimed had the acts with which he is charged
takerv effect in that state; with authority' in the governor of the asylum
state, in case of such surrender, to impose a condition that the person
claimed shall be tried only for the crime for which he is extradited.
Many states including New York provide for trial of persons for
crimes committed outside the state but having their effect within -the
state. It is to be assumed, therefore, that such states will desire to
obtain jurisdiction of such persons by means of extradition, and conversely will be willing to extradite persons for trial under similar laws of
other states, if appropriate safeguards are thrown around such. extradition. It is interesting in this connection that, for purposes of international extradition, a person has been held to be a-'fugitive' who was
not in the requesting state when the crime in question was committed.
See Rex v. Godfrey (K. B., 1922) 39 Times Law Rep. 5; Note, 23 Columbia Law Rev. 176.
If opposition should be grea to extradition of a person who was not
in the demanding state when the crime in question was committed, it

DUTIES OF THE ASYLUM STATE
would seem that it would be necessary to strengthen the laws of conspiracy in each state so as to impose appropriate penalties upon those
who participate in a conspiracy in one state which results in the commission of a crime in another state."
This study then makes reference to the "Constitutional Considerations" relative to Section 6 and such are included herein as
such presents the study made by this Commission on this subject
and not easily attainable elsewhere.
"Constitutional Considerations
Section 6 of the Uniform Extradition Act provides for extradition
from one state to another, in the discretion of the Governor, of a
person charged with a crime in the requesting state although he was not
in the state at the time-the alleged crime was committed and therefore
has not fled therefrom. It is proposed to add that the act alleged to have
been done shall also be a crime in the requested state, and that the
Governor may extradite upon condition that the person claimed to be
tried for the extradition crime only. As this section is entirely novel in
providing legislative authority in an asylum state for surrender on demand of a class of persons not required to be surrendered under the
Constitution, no judicial pronouncement heretobefore made can be looked
to as direct authority for declaring the proposed section or any action
taken thereunder to be either constitutional or unconstitutional. The
provision has not apparently been passed upon in any of the ten jurisdictions which have adopted the uniform act.
There are a number of cases in which the surrender of a fugitive
has been held invalid because 'not authorized by the Constitution'; and
dicta appear in these and other cases stating or implying that State action
is limited to the requirements of the Constitution, and that the rights of a
person accused of crime are violated if he is delivered up in a case not
'authorized by the Constitution.'
Among these cases, the more important are: Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Pet. 539 (1842); Hyatt v. People ex rel Corkran,188 U. S. 691,
23 Sup. Ct. 456 (1903), affirming 172 N. Y. 76 (1902); Ex parte Reggel,
114 U. S. 642, at 651; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80 (1885); Innes v.
Tobin, 240 U. S. 127, 36 Sup. Ct. 293 (1916).
Analysis of these decisions and statements, however, shows that
they are not applicable to state legislation, not pased in fulfillment of
the constitutional duty of extradition, but passed under the residuum
of sovereign power remaining in the states. On the other hand general
principles of constitutional law and of constitutional interpretation appear to support such legislation as is incorporated in section 6 of the
Uniform Act.
(1) Sovereignty inheres in the several states over all matters as to
which they have neither surrendered their authority to the federal government, nor restricted themselves to a certain course of action, by the
provisions of the Constitution. The question then resolves itself to this:
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Whether subdivision 2 of Article IV of the Constitution was intended
either as a delegation to the federal government of exclusive authority
to regulate the rendition from one state to another of persons charged
with crime, or as a prohibition on the several states against surrendering on request of another state a person found within their borders,
except as provided by the Constitution; or if, on the contrary, it was
not intended merely as a requirement of cooperation in certain specified
cases,- leaving to the states full power in this field beyond the constitutional requirements.
In Prigg v. Commonwealth,, 16 Peters 539 (1842), the same problem
of construction was raised with respect to subdivision 3 of No. 2, of
Article IV, which provided for return of fugitive slaves. From the
opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Storey, it is not clear
whether the Pennsylvania statute was regarded as unconstitutional in
toto because exclusive authority to regulate the return of fugitive slaves
was vested in the federal government, or whether only so much of the
statute as was repugnant to the Constitution and the federal act was
held invalid. The concurring opinion of Taney, J., insisting on the latter
construction seems most consonant with ordinary rides of construction,
and seems equally applicable to the extradition provision.
Upon such a construction, the decisions holding invalid extradition
of persons not fugitives within the meaning of the Constitution may be
read as holding merely that the action' of the Governor was invalid
because unauthorized by the Constitution-there being no state law
upon which to support it.
(2) It has been held that a person illegally taken into a state
which wishes to prosecute him cannot compel his own return to the
asylum state nor object to the ensuing prosecution.
(Pettibone v.
Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 (1906). This doctrine of 'non asylum' shows
that there is nothing unconstitutional in his transfer from state to state
in a way other than that expressly provided by the Constitution. It
would seem fairly to follow that if there were a law in the asylum state
providing for such transfer, that transfer would be neither illegal.nor
unconstitutional.
(3) The power of a state to deal with alleged criminals for its own
protection has been made the basis of a number of decisions upholding
state legislation dealing with arrest preliminary to extradition proceedings, though the Constitution does not authorize such arrest.
(4) The police power of a state over persons within the state may
be invoked to authorize extradition not only for the purpose of expelling
undesirables, but also for the purpose of aiding other states. On this
ground statutes providing for rendition of witnesses in criminal cases
have been upheld.
(5) In the exercise of its police power each state is, of course,
limited by the rbquirements of due process of law. Unlike the requirement that the extradited person be substantially shown to be charged
with crime, a requirement of actual presence in the demanding state at
the time of the alleged crime, has no logical or practical relation to due
process. In view of the fact that a person may be no less a fugitive
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from justice and from the constituted authorities of the demanding state
because he took the preliminary precaution of operating from without
the state, and in view of the fact that as the decisions now stand actual
flight, in the sense of seeking to escape, is not required, and mere departure makes the person charged a fugitive, insistance upon the technical interpretation of 'fleeing from' seems an unreasonable limitation to
place upon the power of a state to deal with persons within its borders.
The constitutionality of section 6 of the Uniform Act as drafted by
the Commissioners on Uniform Laws seems clear, not being in conflict
with the extradition provisions of the Constitution or of the federal laws,
but being supplementary thereto, and within the states police power
in dealing with crime and cirninals: The Committee on Uniform State
Laws of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York has taken
this view. Since the section is extra-constitutional, that is, is entirely
outside the constitutional requirements pertaining to interstate rendition,
there can be no question of the validity of the qualifications, recommended, in this report, giving discretion to the Governor of the State,
or permitting him to impose conditions to his surrender of the person
demanded."
In support of the conclusion that this section is "extra-constitutional and is constitutionally permissible is the U. S. Supreme
Court decision of Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, which upheld the
right of a Governor of an asylum State to waive the right of that
State to retain the claimed fugitive and to surrender him to the
demanding State.
The same conclusion was reached by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Ashe, 173 Atl. 715, 114 Pa. Sup.
119, holding that a law of Pennsylvania is valid that authorizes a
permissible surrender by the Governor of that State of a person
imprisoned for a term less than life upon demand of the Governor of
another State, when the demanded person is charged in the latter
state with murder with the proviso that prior to the removal of
such a fugitive from the State of Pennsylvania the executive authority of a demanding state shall agree that the person so delivered
up is to be returned immediately to Pennsylvania at the cost of the
demanding state to serve the balance of his term of imprisonment
in the event of his acquittal in the demanding state or in the event
of his conviction in the demanding state of manslaughter or of any
degree of murder, the punishment for which is less than death or
imprisonment for life.
The Court holds that the Governor surrendering such a fugitive "he is delivered to the other state for trial as a matter of comity, and it becomes a matter of agreement between the executives
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of the states, made previously or later, as to what shall afterwards
be done with the prisoner," and such surrender is not governed by
the Federal Constitution or its laws.2"
A similar thought is expressed in State v. Brown, 64 S. W. (2d)
841, 166 Tenn. 669 as follows:
"There is no language in the constitutional provision, nor in the
statute enacted by Congress, expressly mhaking presence in the demanding state, at the time the crime was committed, essential to the right of
extradition. The language of the Constitution (Const. U. S. art. 4, §2)
is that the right shall exist with respect to one 'who shall flee from
Justice, and be found in another State.' The statute (18 USCA, §662)
gives effect to that provision by directing that the demand shall be made
by the Governor of the state 'from whence the person so charged has
fled.
'The constitutional provision that a person charged with crime
against the laws of a state, and who flees from its justice, must be delivered up on proper demand, is sufficiently comprehensive to embrace
any offense, whatever its nature, which the state, consistently with the
Constitution and laws of the United States, may have made a crime
against its laws.' Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 'U. S. 222, 227, 27 S.
Ct. 122, 123, 51 L. Ed 161, 163, 7 Ann. Cas. 1073. 'The provision of both
the constitution and the statutes extends to all crimes and offenses punishable by the laws of the state where the act is done.' Lascelles v.
Georgia, supra.
The Supreme Court has not undertaken to limit or restrict the scope
and application of the constitutional direction by strict construction.
On the contrary, it has declared that 'a faithful, vigorous enforcement of
that stipulation is vital to the harmony and welfare of the states'; and
that it should 'be not so narrowly interpreted as to enable offenders
against the laws of a state to find a permanent asylum in the territory
of another state.' Appleyard v. Massachusetts,supra. The constitutional
and statutory provisions 'have not been construed narrowly and technically by the courts as if they were penal laws, but liberally, to effect
their important purpose.' Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U. S.
128, 133, 38 S.Ct. 41, 43, 62 L. Ed. 193, 198."
An extreme authority is the case of Ex parte Gornostayoff, 298
P. 55, 113 Cal. App. 255, decided in 1931, without any citation of
a supporting authority. A return to the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus showed that the prisoner was detained by virtue
of a warrant issued by the Governor of the State of California directing the extradition of the petitioner to the State of Ohio. The
Governor's warrant was based upon indictment filed against the
petitioner in the State of Ohio in 1927 charging him with having
committed a felony in 1927 "to-wit, with having failed to support
20

See also People) v. Klinger, 319 111. 275, 149 N. E. 799, 42 A. L. R. 585.
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two minor children. Petitioner claims he was not within the demanding state on said last-mentioned date. There is no merit in
the petition. Considering the character of the offense with.which he
is charged, his presence within the state was not necessary to enable
him to commit the same." The Court denied the habeas corpus
petition.
The conclusion of the committee and the validity of Section 6
is fully supported by the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court
in Kansas v. Wellman, 170 P. 1052, 102 Kan. 503, L. R. A. 1918D
949, Ann. Cas. 1918D 1006. Therein it is to be noted that the defendant contended that not being in the State at the time of the
lleged commission of the offense charged he was not- a fugitive
from justice and therefore was not within the province of the Federal statute. In part the Court said:
'In this contention so far as relates to the regularity of the arrest,
he is borne out by the authorities. The rule invoked results in the unfortunate and anomalous possibility that a murderer standing in North
Carolina, for instance, may shoot and kill a man just over the line in
Tennessee, and escape conviction in the former state on the ground that
he had committed no crime within its jurisdiction (cases cited), and
avoid prosecution in the latter cause, not being a fugitive from justice
he is not amenable to interstate rendition" (Citations).

More directly the Court says:
"While the Federal statute does not impose a duty upon the Governor of a State to recognize a requisition for the delivery of a person
who is accused of an offense committed while he was not personally
within the State whose laws he is charged with breaking, there would

seem to be no legal obstacle to a State's providing by statute for the
,sulrendering of a person within its jurisdiction to a State whose laws
he is accused of violating while not physically within its borders, although without such legislation no authority therefor exists. 19 Cyc. 85;
11 R. C. L. 732; Innes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127.221
Is Section 6 "Extra-Constitutional?"
While the report of the committee which drafted this provision
The text in 11 R. C. L. p. 732 is:
"Moreover, it has bees held that a state may, in the exercise of its reserved
sovereign powers, provide by statute for the surrender, on requisition, of
persons who are indictable for a crime committed through their constructive
presence in a sister state, although they have not been corporally within such
state and have never fled therefrom to escape arrest and punishment, but in
the absence of such statute such persons are not subject to extradition by the
latter state."
To the same effect see Id. pp. 722-3. An examination of the references given
do not support this text. The same is true relative to the citation in Cyc.
21
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states that this section is extra-constitutional, it is submitted that

this conclusion is questionable, especially considering the words
used in the Federal Constitution and the Federal statute enacted
to carry the constitutional provision into effect.
The constitutional provision applies to persons who "shall flee"
and shall be delivered up "on demand of the executive Authority
of the State from which he fled."
Section 5278 similarly refers to the asylum State "to which
such person has fled" in two instances and to the demanding State
as !'from whence the person . . . has fled" with notice of the ar-

rest to the demanding State or its agent appointed "to receive the
fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent."
It is submitted that this matter is considered by the U. S. Supreme Court in Innes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127 and that the effect
of this opinion is to hold that the Federal constitutional provision
and the statute passed pursuant thereto is exclusive and permits
the extradition of only a person who is in the true sense of the
word a fugitive, that is, was physically present in the demanding
State, as heretofore detailed, and after the coinmission of a crime
made flight therefrom. In part the Supreme Court in this opinion
said:
"First. For the purpose of the solution of the inquiry under this
heading we treat the following proposition as beyond question: (a)
That prior to the adoption of the Constitution fugitives from justice were
surrendered between the States conformably to what were deemed to
be the controlling principles of comity. Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How.
66, 101, 102; 2 Moore on Extradition and Interstate Rendition, p. 820
et seq. (b) That it was intended by the provision of the Constitution'
to fully embrace or rather to confer authority upon Congress to deal
with such subject. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539; Kentuckyv. Dennison, supra; Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366; Appleyard v. Massachusetts,

203 U. S. 222. (c)That the act of 1793 (now Rev. Stat., No. 5278) was
enacted for the purpose of controlling the subject in so far as it was
deemed wise to do so, and that its provisions were intended to be dominant and so far as they operated controlling and exclusive of state
power. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, supra; Kentucky v. Dennison, supra, pp.

104, 105; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S.700; Lascelles v. Georgia, 1.48 U. S.
537.
Coming in the light of these principles to apply the statute, it is
not open to question that its provisions expressly or by necessary implicati6n prohibited the surrender of a person in one State for removal
as a fugitive to another where it clearly appears that the person was not
and could not have been a fugitive from the justice of the demanding
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State. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80;
Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U. S. 691; Bassing v. Cacly, 208 U. S. 386, 392.
We are thus brought to the remaining heading,
Second. Although the order for rendition was not in conflict either
expressly or by necessary implication with any of the provisions of the
Constitution or statute, was it nevertheless void under the circumstances
because it dealt with a subject with which it was beyond the power
of the State to deal and which was therefore brought as the result of
the adoption of the statute within exclusive Federal control although
no provision dealing with such subject is found in the statute? To appreciate this question, the proposition relied upon needs to be accurately
stated. It is this: The Constitution provides for the rendition to a
State of a person who shall have fled from justice and be found"in another State, that is, for the surrender by the State in which the fugitive
is found. This, it is conceded, would cover the case and sustain the
authority exercised, as the accused was a fugitive from-'the justice of
Georgia and was found in Texas. But the proposition insists that the
statute is not as broad as the Constitution sin.ce it provides not for the
surrender of the fugitive by the State in which he is found but only for
his. surrender by the State into which he has fled, thus leaving unprovided for the case of a fugitive from justice who. is found in a State but
who -has not fled into such State because brought into such State involuntarily by a re~luisition from another. And the argument is supported by the contention that as the statute exercises the power conferred by the Constitution and is exclusive, it occupies the whole field
and prohibits all state action even upon a subject for which the statute
has not provided and which therefore in no manner comes within its
express terms. But we are of the opinion that the contention rests upon
a mistaken premise and unwarrantedly extends the scope of the decided
cases upon which it relies. The first, because it erroneously assumes
that although the statute leaves a subject with which there was power to
deal under the Constitution unprovided for, it therefore took all matters
within such unprovided area out of any possible state action. And the
second, because while it is undoubtedly true that in the decided cases
relied upon (Kentucky v. Dennison, supra; Roberts v. Reilly, supra;
Hyatt v. Corkran, supra) the exclusive character of the legislation embodied in the statute was recognized, those cases when rightly consideredi go no further than to establish the exclusion by the statute of
all state action from the matters for which the statute expressly or by
necessary implication provided.
No reason is suggested nor have we been able to discover any, to
sustain the assumption that the framers of the statute in not making its
provisions exactly coterminous with the power granted by the Constitution did so for the purpose of leaving the subject so far as unprovided for beyond the operation of any legal authority whatever, state
or national. On the contrary, when the situation with which the statute
dealt is contemplated, the reasonable assumption is that by the omission
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to extend the statute to the full limits of constitutional power it must
have been intended to leave the subjects unprovided for not beyond
the pale of all law, but subject to the power which then controlled
them-state authority until it was deemed essential by further legislation to govern them exclusively by national authority. In fact, such
conclusion is essential to give effect to the act of Congress, since to hold
to the contrary would render inefficacious the regulations provided concerning the subjects with which it dealt. This becomes manifest when it
is considered that if the proposition now insisted upon were accepted, it
would follow that the delivery of a criminal who was a fugitive from
justice by one State on a requisition by another would exhaust the power
and the criminal, therefore, whatever might be the extent and character
of the crimes committed in other States, would remain in the State into
which he had been removed without any authority to deliver him to
other States from whose justice he had fled. And this, while paralyzing
the authority of all the States, it must be moreover apparent, would
cause them all to become involuntary asylums for criminals, for no
method is suggested by which a criminal brought into a State by requisition if acquitted could be against his will deported, since to admit such
power would be virtually to concede the right to surrender him to another State as a fugitive from justice for a crime committed within its
borders."
Supporting this conclusion is also Appleyard v. Massachusetts,
203 U. S. 222 at 227, quoted with approval in Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of the City of New York, 245 U. S. 128, as

follows:
"'A person charged by indictment or by affidavit before a magistrate with the commission within a State of a crime covered by its laws,
and who, after the date of the commission of such crime leaves the
State-no matter for what purpose or with what motive, nor under'what
belief-becomes, from the time of such leaving, and within the meaning
of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, a fugitive from
justice, and if found in another State must be delivered up by the Governor of such State to the State whose laws are alleged to have been
violated, on the production of such indictment or affidavit, certified as
authentic by the Governor of the State from which the accused departed.
Such is the command of the Supreme law of the land, which may not be
disregardedby any "State.'"
Also in State of South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U. S. 412, the
Supreme Court in stating that the rights of the party depended
upon the proper construction and application of the Federal Constitutional provision and the Federal legislation decreed:
"It was the duty of that Court to administer the law prescribed by
the constitution and statute of the United States, as construed by this
Court." (Cases cited.)
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The remarks of Mr. Justice Peckham in Hyatt v. Corkran, 188
U. S. 691 have been referred to in support of the principle that a
State may provide for the extradition of a person not physically
present in the demanding State at the time of the crime and is also
referred to as opposed to this principle.
Scott in his work on Interstate Rendition commenting thereon
states:
"Mr. Justice Peckham facetiously, -yet truthfully, reminded these
22
executives of their error in these words." (Quotation given below.)
The reminder being: .
"The exercise of jurisdiction by a State to make an act committed
outside its borders a crime against the State is one thing, but to assert
that the party committing such act comes under the Federal statute,
and is to be delivered up as a fugitive from the justice of that State, is
quite a different proposition."'
This duty of all tribunals and persons to administer the law
prescribed by the Federal Constitution and by the Federal legislation are stated as "obligatory upon every state and a part of the
law of every state," 23 and "which each state is bound, in fidelity to
3,24
the Constitution to recognige ....
Likewise the exclusiveness of the Federal Constitution and law
and the duty of the State Courts to adhere to it as interpreted by
the U. S. Supreme Court is expressed in the following cases: Ex
parte Hagan,245 S. W. 336 at 338, 295 Mo. 435; Ex parte Bergman,
130 S. W. 174 at 176 and 180; Hibler v. State, 43 Texas 197 at 203;
People v. Murray, 192 N. E. 198, 357 Ill. 326, 94 A. L. R. 1487;
Commonwealth v. Hare, 36 Pa. Sup. Ct. 125 at 129 and 130; In re
Henlke, 177 N. W. 880, 13 A. L. R. 409; People v. Baldwin, 174 N.
E. 51 at 53, 341 IlM. 604; Ex parte Roberts, 56 P. (2d) 703, 704;
Grogan v. Welch, 227 N. W. 74, 67 A. L. R. 1474 at 1476 and 1479.
While I do not question, in view, of the foregoing considerations,
a State may pass legislation in aid of and supplementary to the
Federal Constitution and the Federal Statute, or as termed in the
report "extra-constitutional" legislation, I most humbly submit that
I have grave doubts that Section 6 is extra-constitutional legislation
for to me it is apparent that the constitutional provision and the
Federal statute permits the extradition only of a fugitive who was
actually present in the demanding State at the time of the com22

Scott on Interstate Rendition, p. 77.

See also Id. §8, p. 10.

23 Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wallace 366.

24Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U. S. 222, 227-8.
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mission of the crime or there committed an act which constituted
a part of a later consummated crime, and thereby, or at least by
necessary implication, prohibits the surrender of the person as a

fugitive when that person was not in the demanding State at the
time of the commission of the crime, although he had committed
an intentional act or acts resulting in a crime in the demanding
state. Such I believe to be the decision of the Supreme Court in

Innes v. Tobin, supra, which stated:
'It is not open to question that its provisions expressly or by necessary implication prohibit the surrender of a person in one state for removal, as a fugitive to another where it clearly appears that the person
was not and could not have been a fugitive from the justice of the

demanding state."
Because the Uniform Extradition Act has been enacted in
many States unquestionably the constitutionality of Section 6 will
come before our highest tribunals for decision, and in the event
that this section should be declared unconstitutional.it is submitted
that the States are not without power to secure the return of a
criminal contemplated by this section, as the various states could
enter into a compact similar to that now existing for the supervision and return of parolees. Under the compact provision of the
Constitution of the United States consent for such compacts have
already been granted by the Federal Congress by an act effective
June 6, 1934, entitled "An Act granting the consent of Congress
to any two or more States to enter into Agreements or Compacts
assistance in the prevention of
for cooperative effort and mutual
'2 5
crime, and for other purposes.1
25 See remarks and charge to Grand Jury by Judge William Clark, then
District Judge of the District Court of New Jersey, now Judge of the Third Circuit
of the U. S. Circuit Court, in U. S. v. Flegenhemer, 14 Fed. Sup. 584, wherein
he states:
"As the Constitution as now written gives the federal government no
power over interstate extradition, we are compelled to resort to the legislation

of the different members of the federation, namely, the sovereign states." ,
And also in which he -states that the constitutional provision relative to compacts
is "in the form of a prohibition against, and not a granti to the states," and urges
the drafting of an extradition act under Art. 4, Sec. 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution
or the passage by the State of New Jersey of an effective Uniform Eitradition
Act.

